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Abstract: Are groups ever capable of bearing responsibility, over and above their 
individual members? This chapter discusses and defends the view that certain organized 
collectives – namely, those that qualify as group moral agents – can be held responsible 
for their actions, and that group responsibility is not reducible to individual responsibility. 
The view has important implications. It supports the recognition of corporate civil and 
even criminal liability in our legal systems, and it suggests that, by recognizing group 
agents as loci of responsibility, we may be able to avoid “responsibility gaps” in some 
cases of collectively caused harms for which there is a shortfall of individual 
responsibility. The chapter further asks whether the view that certain groups are 
responsible agents commits us to the view that those groups should also be given rights 
of their own and gives a qualified negative answer. 
A central feature of our social world is our practice of assigning responsibility to one another 
for our actions. We treat one another as responsible agents, and on this basis, we praise one 
another for some actions and blame one another for others. The practice of assigning 
responsibility underlies both civil and criminal law. This raises the question of what the loci of 
responsibility are: who or what are the entities capable of bearing responsibility? Are individual 
human beings the only such entities, or are groups, especially organized collectives, 
appropriate targets for the assignment of responsibility as well? Given the influential roles that 
many collectives play in the social world, from states and corporations to courts and 
committees, this question is of great importance for morality and politics as well as for the law. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe and defend the view that certain organized collectives 
– namely, group agents – can be held responsible for their actions, over and above their 
individual members, and that group responsibility is not reducible to individual responsibility.1 
This view has some important implications. There are some things that happen in the social 
world, including some harms, that cannot easily be attributed to any single individual or even 
any number of individuals. If individual human beings were the only entities capable of bearing 
responsibility, then we might not be able to identify anyone who bears sufficient responsibility 
 
* I am very grateful to Hein Duijf for helpful comments on this chapter. 
1 The literature on the responsibility of collectives is large, and I cannot provide a comprehensive review here. 
See, among others, Feinberg (1968), Held (1970), French (1984), May (1987), Erskine (2001), Copp (2006), Pettit 




in such cases. We might be faced with “responsibility gaps” or “responsibility voids”: 
situations where some significant harm has occurred, but there is a shortfall of attributable 
responsibility.2 If, on the other hand, there are responsible group agents to whom the actions in 
question can be attributed, we may be able to avoid such responsibility gaps. And indeed, many 
jurisdictions recognize some forms of corporate civil and even criminal liability, holding 
certain collective entities responsible over and above their individual members. If the notion 
of group responsibility can be defended, then this legal practice stands on a firm footing. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1, I will introduce the problem of group 
responsibility in more detail and put this chapter’s question into sharper focus. In Section 2, I 
will say more about the conditions an entity must meet in order to count as “fit to be held 
responsible”. While adult human beings are normally assumed to meet those conditions, it is 
much less clear whether collectives could do so too. In Sections 3 and 4, I will introduce the 
idea of group agency and explore whether group agents can be fit to be held responsible. In 
Section 5, I will look at the relationship between individual and group responsibility and outline 
the case for the irreducibility of group responsibility. In Section 6, finally, I will ask whether 
the view that certain groups are responsible agents also commits us to the view that those 
groups should be given rights of their own, and I will give a qualified negative answer. 
An important disclaimer is due: my focus in this chapter is on the question of whether certain 
groups can be loci of responsible agency in their own right; it is not on what responsibilities 
individuals have in the context of their participation in collective actions or their membership 
in certain groups. I will touch on the latter question only in passing. In taking the present 
approach to the subject of group responsibility, I am building on my earlier work on group 
agency, especially my joint work with Philip Pettit.3 Others would undoubtedly approach the 
subject from different angles, but given space constraints, I cannot cover the subject in its 
entirety here. 
1. The problem of group responsibility 
Our lives are profoundly affected by the activities of many collectives. These include not just 
firms and commercial corporations, but also states, other governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, courts, health-care providers, universities, expert panels, clubs, and many 
 
2 See, e.g., Braham and van Hees (2011, 2018), Collins (2017, 2018), Duijf (2018a), and Buell (2018). 
3 See List and Pettit (2011) and List (2018a,b). See further Pettit (2007), from whom I am borrowing the language 
of “fitness to be held responsible”. The present approach has many precursors in the literature; recall footnote 1. 




informal groups. All of these make a difference to people’s lives through their decisions and 
actions, and sometimes cause harms, either by accident or as more or less predictable 
externalities or side-effects of what they do. Examples readily come to mind: from the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by BP’s drilling operations, through 
the environmental degradation caused by big industry, to the recent Windrush scandal in the 
UK, where the rights of many legal residents were infringed due to a change in the country’s 
immigration policies. As is widely acknowledged, when harms result from the actions of 
collective entities, it is not always easy to identify one or several individuals to whom all of 
the relevant responsibility can be attributed. It is possible that most, or even all, of the 
individual members of the collectives in question have acted in ways that were reasonable, 
given their circumstances, and are therefore individually blameless or only blameworthy to a 
small extent, and yet their individual contributions have jointly produced a very harmful 
outcome. In this way, the sum-total of individual responsibility may fall short of the full amount 
of responsibility that we might intuitively find appropriate for the harm caused. There seems 
to be a shortfall of attributable responsibility: a partial or even complete “responsibility gap” 
or “responsibility void”.4  
An illuminating example, given by Philip Pettit, is that of the Herald of Free Enterprise, a 
car ferry in the English Channel which sank on its way from Zeebrugge to Dover in 1987.5 
Almost two hundred people died. An inquiry found that the operating company, Townsend 
Thoresen, was extremely sloppy and had very bad safety standards. As a commentator put it, 
“[f]rom top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness”.6 
Nonetheless, strikingly, nobody was found legally responsible to an extent that seemed 
commensurate with the harm that had occurred. The same commentator noted: “the primary 
requirement of finding an individual who was liable … stood in the way of attaching any 
significance to the organizational sloppiness that had been found by the official enquiry”.7 
Because the ferry company was not considered a locus of responsibility, there was no agent to 
 
4 Recall the references in footnote 2. Interestingly, responsibility gaps might be viewed as involving a violation 
of what is sometimes called “moral harmony”. In the words of Portmore (2018, p. 318), an account of morality is 
“harmonious” if “the agents who satisfy [it], whoever and however numerous they may be, are guaranteed to 
produce the morally best world that they have the option of producing.” Perhaps, then, responsibility gaps could 
occur only against the background of an insufficiently harmonious criterion of individually reasonable action. 
That said, the envisaged scenarios seem familiar enough from the perspective of commonsense morality to be 
worth investigating. I am grateful to Hein Duijf for pressing me to address this point. 
5 See Pettit (2007) and List and Pettit (2011, ch. 7). 





whom the relevant responsibility could be assigned. The harm was treated, in effect, as if it had 
been the result of a natural disaster or bad brute luck, not the result of anyone’s wrong-doing.  
One view about responsibility, which we may call “individualism”, would vindicate this 
outcome. According to an individualist view about responsibility, only human beings, 
especially adult human beings, are appropriate targets for the assignment of responsibility; 
collectives are not. On such a view, it is appropriate to ask how various individuals have 
contributed to a harmful outcome and, if negligence, recklessness, or wrong-doing can be 
established, to hold them individually accountable. But, on the individualist view, the collective 
itself cannot be held responsible over and above its members. If, even after the most careful 
accounting, the sum-total of individual responsibility falls short of the amount of responsibility 
that would seem commensurate with the harm done, then we would have to bite the bullet and 
accept that no further responsibility can be assigned.  
A competing view is “collectivism”. According to it, collectives may sometimes be held 
responsible in their own right, independently of the individuals involved. The key idea is that 
there can in principle be collective responsibility without any corresponding individual 
responsibility. In limiting cases, a collective entity could be held responsible for some outcome 
without any of its members bearing any individual responsibility. Of course, the details of when 
this is so, and what exactly it means, need to be spelt out further, and I will turn to them later.  
The collectivist view is sometimes motivated by the observation that unless we are prepared 
to assign responsibility to certain collectives in their own right, the occurrence of some 
undesirable responsibility gaps is inevitable in practice. However, from the premises that  
(1) on the individualist view, there may sometimes be responsibility gaps, and that 
(2) responsibility gaps are undesirable,  
we cannot derive the conclusion that  
(3) the collectivist view is correct.  
The argument from (1) and (2) to (3) would be a non-sequitur. Premises (1) and (2) are 
insufficient to establish collectivism about responsibility. Perhaps it is simply an unfortunate 
fact about morality that there is sometimes a shortfall of individually attributable responsibility, 
and it is wishful thinking to expect that in every such case one could close the gap by 
identifying a responsible collective. 
Indeed, we can easily imagine cases of collectively caused harms for which it is implausible 
to hold anyone – whether individuals or the collective – responsible. Imagine, for instance, a 
freak accident in a town centre, where, due to an unusual and unforeseeable confluence of 




involved, nor the police, nor the local government did anything wrong. If this truly is a freak 
accident, then there is no responsibility to be assigned, given that there was nothing wrong with 
anyone’s conduct: no negligence or recklessless, let alone intentional wrong-doing. 
Furthermore, in this case, the relevant collective – the various pedestrians – seems far too 
amorphous to count as a plausible locus of responsibility.8   
In fact, one line of reasoning would suggest that it is actually a misnomer to call this a 
responsibility gap. There simply is no responsibility here. It is no different from a natural 
disaster, as far as responsibility is concerned. We would not normally look for a responsible 
agent in the case of a genuine natural disaster.9 Now, the proponents of an individualist view 
about responsibility might insist that the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise is similar. If, as 
we may stipulate for the sake of argument, there was no wrong-doing on the part of any 
individuals, then the ferry disaster might be like the stampede or a natural disaster. 
If we still want to argue that the ferry company should be held responsible as a collective 
entity, independently of the extent of any wrong-doing by relevant individuals, we need a more 
careful account of the conditions that an entity must meet in order to count as “fit to be held 
responsible”. Once we have specified those conditions, we are in a better position to adjudicate 
whether collectives could be bearers of responsibility in their own right.10   
2. The conditions for responsibility 
Adult human beings are paradigmatic examples of entities that we consider capable of bearing 
responsibility for their actions: they qualify as “fit to be held responsible”, as Philip Pettit puts 
it. 11  Are adult human beings the only such entities, or could other entities also qualify? 
 
8 On the distinction between organized and random collections, and on whether the latter can bear responsibility, 
see also Held (1970). 
9 I speak of “genuine” natural disasters here in order to set aside those disasters that have a plausible anthropogenic 
source, such as anthropogenic-climate-change-induced disasters. The latter arguably do raise questions of 
responsibility. 
10 Hein Duijf (in correspondence) has suggested the following more nuanced analysis of the (formally invalid) 
argument from (1) and (2) to (3). First, note that the claim that there may sometimes be responsibility gaps, as 
asserted by premise (1), implicitly relies on some background theory of responsibility. After all, it is claimed that 
individuals are not responsible, and yet that something has happened that would somehow warrant the attribution 
of responsibility. Now, if we further accept the claim that such responsibility gaps are undesirable, as asserted by 
premise (2), then we may well conclude that our background theory of responsibility is in some ways defective, 
and that we should revise it. At this point, several avenues are open to us. One would be to deny that there are any 
responsibility gaps. A second would be to revise the criteria for the attribution of individual responsibility. And a 
third would be to extend the loci of responsibility, by recognizing collectives as responsible agents. Finally, one 
might combine two or more of these avenues. Against the background of this analysis, the argument from (1) and 
(2) to (3) is still invalid, but premises (1) and (2) lend some support to the conclusion that something needs to be 
revised, even though accepting (3) is not the only possible way this revision could go. See further Duijf (2018b). 




Obviously, we don’t want to answer this question just by stipulation. Rather, we would like to 
appeal to some general conditions for fitness to be held responsible. These will hopefully 
vindicate our assumptions in the paradigmatic human case, while helping us to clarify what is 
going on in other cases. For the purposes of this article, I will treat the following conditions as 
necessary and sufficient for fitness to be held responsible.12  
Moral agency: The entity is an intentional agent and has the capacity to make normative 
judgments about its choices and to be guided by those judgments.   
Relevant information: The entity has the information needed for assessing its choices 
normatively, or it has at least reasonable access to such information. 
Free choice: The entity has the freedom and control required for making its choices. 
To see that these conditions are indeed required for fitness to be held responsible, let us briefly 
go through them. The first condition – moral agency – is evidently necessary. Entities that do 
not qualify as intentional agents, such as rocks, arm chairs, or hammers, do not even begin to 
qualify as candidates for bearing responsibility. But intentional agency alone is not enough. 
There are many entities, most notably some non-human animals, that plausibly qualify as 
intentional agents without being moral agents. They exhibit systematic, goal-directed 
behaviour, but they lack the capacity to make judgments about what is right and wrong, 
permissible and impermissible, and to act on the basis of those judgments. And for this reason, 
we do not hold them responsible for anything. The second condition – relevant information – 
is equally necessary. If someone lacks the information – or even reasonable access to the 
information – required for a normative assessment of his or her choices, perhaps due to the 
constraints of his or her environment, then it would not be justified to hold him or her 
responsible (and certainly not fully responsible) for choices made in those circumstances. 
Finally, the third condition – free choice – captures the widely accepted idea that freedom and 
control, of some sort, are necessary for responsibility. If someone has no freedom or control in 
relation to his or her actions – perhaps he or she lacks alternative possibilities or has no causal 
control over what he or she does – then it would seem problematic to hold him or her fully 
responsible for those actions. 13  Consistently with this, freedom-or-control-undermining 
 
12 The conditions build on the ones in List and Pettit (2011, ch. 7), which, in turn, are variants of conditions in 
Pettit (2007). 
13 There are some complications here that I cannot go into, given space constraints. For instance, Frankfurt (1969) 
has argued that alternative possibilities are not needed for responsibility. I accept that one may debate the precise 
nature of the “free choice” requirement for responsibility, but I assume that at least some suitably qualified such 




constraints, whether external or psychological, are often thought to be responsibility-
undermining as well. While these considerations suggest that the three conditions are each 
necessary for fitness to be held responsible, I will also assume that they are jointly sufficient.   
It should be evident that it is very much a contingent question which entities meet these 
conditions. While adult human beings paradigmatically satisfy them – or so we tend to believe 
– we must not assume from the outset that some non-human entities could not do so as well. 
There is no conceptual reason, for instance, why future sophisticated robots could not also 
satisfy them; nor should we rule out the possibility that suitably organized collectives could do 
so. Of course, much depends on the details of specific cases. It would be implausible to suggest 
that the collection of pedestrians whose uncoordinated movements accidentally caused a 
stampede constitutes a responsible agent. Random collections are likely to fall short on each of 
the three conditions. But arguably, the satisfaction of the conditions is less implausible in the 
case of a suitably organized collective, such as a commercial corporation or a state. To see 
whether certain collectives can indeed meet them, we must turn to the idea of group agency. 
3. Group agency 
A group agent, in brief, is an organized collective that constitutes a goal-directed, intentional 
agent in its own right, over and above its individual members.14 Examples of group agents are 
firms and corporations, courts, churches, universities, governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and even states. We ascribe beliefs and desires, and other intentional attitudes, 
to those entities and commonly treat them as agents. In fact, the law treats some of those entities 
as artificial persons with certain obligations and a legal status, distinct from the obligations and 
the legal status of their members.  
Now some people might object that the ascription of agency and attitudes to collectives is 
just metaphorical. In a much-quoted passage, Anthony Quinton, for instance, writes: 
“Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions and attitudes ... But these ways of speaking 
are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect 
way of ascribing such predicates to its members ... To say that the industrial working 
class is determined to resist anti-trade union laws is to say that all or most industrial 
workers are so minded.”15 
 
14 On group agency, see, e.g., French (1984), Rovane (1997), Pettit (2001, ch. 5, 2003), Tollefsen (2002, 2015), 
List and Pettit (2006, 2011), and Tuomela (2013). 




On Quinton’s view, any talk of group agency or group attitudes is just a shorthand for 
something that could be equally expressed by reference to the group’s members. However, as 
I will now explain, there are reasons for taking a realist view about group agency, according to 
which at least some groups can truly qualify as intentional agents. Perhaps Quinton is right that 
the industrial working class, like the group of pedestrians in my earlier example, is too 
amorphous to qualify as a genuine agent. But the situation is different in the case of suitably 
organized collectives, such as firms and corporations as well as the other examples mentioned 
at the beginning of this section. Such collectives can be shown to meet the defining conditions 
for intentional agency, and they are in fact routinely treated as agents in the social sciences. 
Let me begin with the defining conditions for agency. One might be tempted to define group 
agency in some kind of sui generis way – say, by describing how a collection of individuals 
must act together to qualify as a group agent – but this approach would be rather ad hoc. It 
would leave open what it is that human beings, group agents, and perhaps other artificial agents 
(such as robots and AI systems) have in common. A more systematic approach is to introduce 
general conditions for intentional agency, not conditions tailor-made for the corporate case, 
and then to ask whether certain groups could meet them. For present purposes, I will adopt a 
relatively simple definition. I will define an intentional agent as an entity, in some environment, 
that meets three conditions:16 
Representation: The entity has representational states, which encode its “beliefs” about 
how things are. 
Motivation: The entity has motivational states, which encode its “goals” or “desires” as 
to how it would like things to be. 
Action: The entity has the capacity to interact with its environment, in a way that 
systematically involves those states: the entity is responsive to information from its 
environment and “acts” in pursuit of its goals or desires in line with its beliefs. 
Clearly, a great variety of entities can meet these conditions, from human beings and non-
human animals to certain kinds of robots and AI systems. Each of these can be readily 
subsumed under the belief-desire-action structure described. Even a system as simple as a 
thermostat can be interpreted as meeting the conditions: it has representational states, 
representing the actual temperature of its environment, motivational states, representing a 
 
16 This definition, which expresses a version of the Humean belief-desire conception of agency, draws on List and 




target temperature, and a capacity to interact with its environment, by measuring the 
temperature and regulating the heating so as to bring the actual temperature in line with the 
target. It is important to recognize that intentional agents lie on a spectrum, and that their 
capacities can range from very basic to extremely complex. Human beings, for instance, have 
a great variety of internal psychological states that go beyond beliefs and desires, and their 
capacities give them moral agency, over and above mere intentional agency; more on this later.  
Given all this, the claim that certain organized collectives can meet the defining conditions 
for intentional agency should be fairly uncontroversial. Indeed, the theory of the firm in 
economics depicts firms and commercial corporations as belief-desire agents, which rationally 
maximize expected profits in line with certain beliefs about their commercial environment.17 
Likewise, the so-called “realist” theory of international relations depicts states as belief-desire 
agents, which rationally pursue their goals and objectives in line with their beliefs about the 
international world.18 In game-theoretic models of the Cold War, for instance, the United States 
and the Soviet Union often featured as “rational players”, with certain strategic objectives and 
certain beliefs about how their opponent will behave. Their behaviour was then explained in 
much the same way in which we would ordinarily explain the behaviour of a rational individual, 
such as a consumer in the marketplace. Of course, those explanations are somewhat simplistic, 
but they illustrate that taking an “intentional stance” towards certain collectives – explaining 
their behaviour by viewing them as intentional agents – is a reasonable explanatory strategy.19  
A critic might say that all of this is consistent with interpreting the ascription of agency to 
the collectives in question as nothing more than an instrumentally useful move. Treating groups 
as if they were agents might be explanatorily useful, but that does not imply that group agency 
is a real phenomenon. There is, however, a fairly straightforward philosophy-of-science 
argument for realism about group agency:20 
Premise 1: The ascription of intentional agency to certain collective entities is 
indispensable in (social-)scientific explanations of their behaviour. 
Premise 2: If the ascription of some property to an entity is indispensable in scientific 
explanations of that entity’s behaviour, then we are – at least prima facie – warranted in 
 
17 See, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). 
18 See Waltz (1979) and Snidal (1985). 
19 On the “intentional stance”, see Dennett (1987). On taking that stance towards collectives, see also Tollefsen 
(2015). 
20 For previous versions of this indispensability argument, see List (2018a,b). A similar argument is implicit in 




assuming that the entity really has that property. (The warrant is only prima facie because 
it could still ultimately be defeated by other considerations.) 
Conclusion: We are – at least prima facie – warranted in assuming that the relevant 
collective entities really are intentional agents.  
The argument is certainly valid (the conclusion follows logically from the premises), and I will 
here assume that a case can be made for each premise. The argument is analogous to arguments 
for realism about other properties in the sciences. For instance, from the fact that the ascription 
of certain physical forces to certain entities is indispensable in physical explanations, we often 
derive a prima facie warrant for realism about those physical forces.21 The upshot is that, 
insofar as some of our best theories in the social sciences ascribe intentional agency to certain 
collectives, it is acceptable to treat group agency as a real phenomenon, at least prima facie.  
Before turning to the question of whether certain groups can also qualify as moral agents, I 
should distinguish group agency from two related phenomena: joint action and collective action. 
Joint action is the coordinated action of several individuals under a structure of shared or 
common intentions, for instance when several individuals jointly implement a shared plan.22 
Standard examples are carrying a piece of furniture downstairs together or going for a walk 
together. Collective action is the cooperative action of several individuals more generally, 
whether or not this is based on any shared or common intentions.23 Successfully cooperating 
in the provision of a public good, despite incentives to free-ride, would be an example. Neither 
of these phenomena involves a group agent in its own right. To make sense of joint or collective 
action, we need not view the group itself as an intentional agent. The loci of agency are still 
the individuals.24   
4. Can groups be fit to be held responsible? 
We have seen that there is a case to be made for the claim that certain organized collectives 
qualify as intentional agents in their own right. This is so at least for those collectives for which 
the ascription of agency is explanatorily indispensable, such as firms, corporations, and states, 
among others. By contrast, unorganized collectives such as the group of pedestrians in the 
 
21 This derivation implicitly relies on what is sometimes called “the naturalistic ontological attitude”, the view 
that science is our best guide to ontological questions – questions about which entities and properties are real. See, 
e.g., Quine (1977) and Fine (1984). 
22 On this phenomenon, see, e.g., Bratman (1999, 2014), Gilbert (1989), and Tuomela (2007).  
23 On the problem of collective action, see Olson (1965) and Ostrom (1990).   
24 Gilbert (1989) introduces the idea of a plural subject in her account of joint action. My view is that there are 




example of the stampede would not warrant such an ascription. Now, if we restrict our attention 
to those groups that constitute intentional agents, the possibility that they might also qualify as 
moral agents becomes a live option. Although some of the most familiar cases of non-human 
agency, such as animal agency, fall short of moral agency, I have already pointed out that there 
is no conceptual reason why some non-human entities could not also qualify as moral agents. 
What distinguishes a moral agent from a mere intentional one is the capacity to make normative 
judgments about its choices – judgments about what is right and wrong, permissible and 
impermissible – and to be guided by those judgments. There is no reason why corporations and 
other organized collectives could not have institutional procedures and mechanisms that enable 
them to make such judgments and to let these judgments guide their actions. Whether an 
organized collective is like this depends entirely on how it is designed and structured.25  
What about the other conditions for fitness to be held responsible? Recall that moral agency 
alone is not enough. The entity in question must also have access to the information needed for 
a normative assessment of its choices, and it must have the freedom and control required for 
making those choices. The access-to-information condition is relatively unproblematic. Just as 
individuals with the right cognitive capacities are capable of accessing and processing relevant 
information about their choices, provided their informational environment is not too 
constrained, so are suitably organized group agents. For instance, a commercial corporation is 
no less well placed to access and process information about the likely consequences and 
negative externalities of its actions than any individual human being would be.  
The condition of free choice is trickier. Can group agents genuinely have freedom and 
control in making their choices? I cannot do justice to this question here, but I want to point 
out that, at least given the possibility of intentional group agency, a positive answer is not too 
far-fetched. I take freedom and control to require, at a minimum, two things. First, the relevant 
agent must be able to choose between alternative possibilities. And second, when the agent 
makes a choice, the agent’s intentional state must be the difference-maker of that choice: 
whatever the agent does must not be some sub-agential fluke (such as an uncontrollable reflex 
or spasm). Can group agents meet these requirements?26 
As far as the requirement of alternative possibilities is concerned, I see no reason why they 
could not. Group agents can certainly be faced with choices between alternative courses of 
action. Their choices need not be determined in a way that would have made it impossible for 
 
25 For recent works on corporate moral agency, see, e.g., Björnsson and Hess (2017) and Pasternak (2017). 




them to act any differently from how they did. When a corporation makes a risky decision that 
leads to some disaster, it may be perfectly reasonable to say that this corporation could have 
acted otherwise: the alternative, less risky course of action may have been entirely open to the 
corporation; perhaps its executive board even considered it, but dismissed it.  
Second, group agents can also be said to have control over what they do. Just as – in the 
case of individual agency – the difference-making cause of an individual’s action is arguably 
that individual’s intentional state, so the difference-making cause of a corporate action can 
plausibly be the group agent’s intentional state, for instance as generated through its corporate 
decision-making structure. Although the claim that group agents exercise causal control over 
their actions is vulnerable to the same kinds of philosophical challenges that arise for mental 
causation in the case of individuals, the available philosophical responses to those challenges 
in the individual case arguably carry over to the corporate one.27 I cannot do more than flag 
these issues here. At any rate, I want to note that there is, by now, a large philosophical 
literature that assumes that these obstacles can be overcome and that recognizes the possibility 
of corporate moral responsibility. Peter French’s work on corporate responsibility is a locus 
classicus.28 
In sum, there are theoretical resources available for arguing that some group agents are fit 
to be held responsible. The recognition of corporate responsibility, in turn, may be combined 
with an appropriate penal code at the corporate level. The punishment for corporate wrong-
doing may include, for instance, fines and other sanctions targeting the assets of the relevant 
corporate entities, as well as restrictions on their operating permissions. In the same way in 
which the punishment for an individual’s criminal wrong-doing may be the (perhaps temporary) 
removal of certain liberties, so the punishment for a corporate crime may be a certain kind of 
operating restriction or ban for the group agent.   
The present considerations suggest that society might protect itself against the risk of 
corporate responsibility gaps by legally requiring that group agents operating in high-stakes 
settings should be organized so as to meet the conditions for responsible moral agency. 
According to this proposal, for a powerful group agent to receive its corporate charter or 
operating licence, it would have to demonstrate that it has procedures in place to ensure its 
 
27 My reasoning relies on the account of mental causation in List and Menzies (2009). The solution to the corporate 
problem of mental causation suggested in List and Pettit (2011, ch. 7) is subtly different. On agential control as 
difference-making, see also Himmelreich (2015). 




fitness to be held responsible for its actions.29 In the same way in which universities and other 
organizations receive their accreditation only if they comply with certain legal requirements, 
so powerful group agents in general would be allowed to operate only if they are compliant 
with the conditions for fitness to be held responsible. The details of how this could work are 
complicated, but the present proposal would offer one way to avoid the kind of situation that 
arose in the example of the ferry disaster. Indeed, we can now see that if the ferry company 
truly fell short of the conditions for fitness to be held responsible, then – according to the 
proposal just sketched – the company should never have been permitted to run a ferry service.  
5. How does group responsibility relate to individual responsibility? 
The claim that there can be group responsibility over and above individual responsibility – and 
sometimes even in the absence of individual responsibility – invites a natural objection. Group 
agents are collections of individuals, and they cannot act without their members’ contribution. 
Anything a group agent does depends on what its members do, under the group’s organizational 
structure. Insofar as those members are themselves fit to be held responsible, shouldn’t group 
responsibility somehow translate into member responsibility? In slightly more metaphysical 
terms, since all group-level facts (facts about what a group agent does) presumably “supervene” 
on individual-level facts (facts about what the members do), so the objection goes, it must be 
possible to “reduce” group-level responsibility to individual-level responsibility.30 
The response is that this objection rests on a misconception. It overlooks the fact that, in 
real cases of group agency, unlike in cases of mere joint or collective action, the group itself is 
a locus of agency over and above its members. This means that the agent of the group’s actions 
is the group itself, understood in “corporate” terms, not its individual members, understood in 
“distributive” terms. While the group’s actions are causally and even ontologically dependent 
on the members’ contributions, it does not follow that those actions can also be agentially 
attributed to them. In a case of genuine group agency, the actions of the group agent are not 
correctly classified as actions of its members.  
For a structural analogy, consider the relationship between the actions of an individual 
person and the biological processes within the person’s organism. Even if we accept the 
standard view that the person’s actions are causally and ontologically dependent on the 
 
29 For a related proposal, involving a “developmental rationale” for holding group agents responsible, see List and 
Pettit (2011, ch. 7). 
30 This objection is obviously motivated by a broader background assumption of methodological individualism. 




underlying bodily processes, it would be a mistake to treat any of the constituent body parts – 
say, the visual cortex, the cerebellum, or the muscles – as “agentially responsible” for those 
actions. The visual cortex, the cerebellum, and the muscles all contribute to the person’s 
performance of his or her actions, but these body parts do not qualify as agents of those actions. 
The locus of agency is the person as a whole, not any components of the underlying organism. 
Of course, in this example, the relevant body parts do not qualify as intentional agents 
themselves, and so it would never occur to us to ascribe any agential responsibility to them. 
But even if the function of one of these body parts – say that of the cerebellum – were 
performed by a hypothetical system that did qualify as an agent, it would still not follow that 
the locus of agency for the person’s overall actions was anything other than the person as a 
whole. Similarly, if we take the notion of group agency seriously, we must distinguish between 
the actions of a group agent and the actions of its members, and we must not confuse the former 
with the latter. Just as an individual person’s actions are “located” at the systemic level of the 
person as a whole, not the level of any body parts, so the actions of a group agent are “located” 
at the systemic level of the group as a whole, not the level of its individual members. 
A version of this point was already recognized by Virginia Held in a 1970 article, in which 
she discussed the crucial difference between organized groups and mere random collections: 
“[I]f organized group G is morally responsible for the failure to do A it does not follow 
that member M of G is morally responsible for the failure to do A. If a random collection 
R can be represented as a set equivalent, say, to M & N & Q, then, if R is morally 
responsible, we would seem to be able to conclude that M is morally responsible & N is 
morally responsible & Q is morally responsible. On the other hand, if these same 
members formed an organized group, the group could not be adequately represented as 
equivalent simply to M & N & Q, because its depiction would have to include the decision 
method by which the members act as a group. And the distribution of moral responsibility 
over such a combination would not seem plausible.”31 
That said, depending on the details of the case, some individuals may bear individual 
responsibility for the roles they have played in relation to the group agent’s conduct. They may 
do so to the extent that they have knowingly and voluntarily played some of the following roles: 
• enacting roles, for example as managers, officials, or representatives of the group agent,  
 




• authorizing roles, for example as directors, board members, owners, share-holders, or 
even regulators, or  
• organizational-design roles, for example as founders, policy makers, or institutional 
designers.32 
How exactly the occupants of these roles are responsible for what the group agent does is a 
contingent matter that may differ from case to case. But as I have already emphasized, there is 
no reason to assume that the sum-total of their individual responsibility will always match the 
responsibility of the group agent as a whole. In short, recognizing individual responsibility in 
the context of a group agent is no substitute for recognizing group responsibility.  
It is worth acknowledging two further complications that arise when we try to “distribute” 
group responsibility to the underlying individuals. The first is this. Suppose we took the view 
that individuals are responsible for the difference they have knowingly and willingly made to 
the group’s actions: if they have made a big difference, they would bear significant 
responsibility, whereas if they have made only a small difference or no difference, they would 
bear very little responsibility or none. The problem with this view is that, even if individuals 
have knowingly and willingly contributed to the group’s actions and have wholeheartedly 
endorsed them, they might still come out as bearing no responsibility at all. We can easily 
imagine cases in which the group collectively takes a momentous decision, and yet no-one is 
individually pivotal. The easiest illustration is given by a democratically organized group that 
makes its decisions by majority rule. If a decision is reached by a margin of victory of more 
than one or two votes, then no individual voter is pivotal: no-one can say that if he or she had 
voted differently, this would have changed the outcome (by flipping the majority). In such a 
case, no individual qualifies as a difference-maker of the collective outcome. The lesson is that, 
even in cases in which it seems appropriate to assign responsibility to the group members on 
the basis of their knowing and willing support for the group’s decision, a simple difference-
making criterion would not vindicate this assignment of responsibility. Rather, a more subtle 
criterion would be needed. One example would be the so-called “INUS” or “NESS” criterion. 
According to it, a minimal condition for an individual’s action to count as a significant 
contributor to a collective outcome would be that this individual’s contribution (which we here 
assume is made voluntarily and knowingly) is “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition 
 




which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” or, more generally, “a necessary 
element of a [causally] sufficient set”.33 Of course, more could be said about such a criterion.34  
The second complication is the following. Suppose we thought that at least in 
democratically organized groups, under background conditions of freedom and voluntariness, 
it should not be difficult to “distribute” group responsibility to the individual members. The 
reason is that, for any democratic group decision, we would expect that some individuals 
(normally a majority) will have voted in support of that decision. Those individuals could then 
qualify as bearing some responsibility, regardless of whether they were individually pivotal. In 
particular, we might take the view that a reasonable condition for bearing some individual 
responsibility for a collective decision is having voluntarily and knowingly voted in support of 
it. The problem with this view, however, is that it can still lead to responsibility gaps. A much-
cited example is that of a collegial court making a decision in a breach-of-contract case.35 
Consider the following scenario. A three-member court has to decide whether a defendant is 
liable for breach of contract. The relevant legal doctrine requires the court to make this decision 
on the basis of three background questions: first, did the defendant do the action in question; 
second, did the action go against the relevant contract; and third, was the contract valid in the 
first place? The defendant is liable if and only if the answer to all three questions is “yes”. If, 
on the other hand, the defendant did not do the action, or the action was permitted by the 
contract, or the contract was invalid, then there is no liability. Now we can easily imagine a 
situation in which each member of the court gives a positive answer to two of the three 
questions, but not to the third, with different judges disagreeing about which question is to be 
answered in the negative. The pattern of individual judgments is shown in Table 1.  
 Action done? Prohibited by 
the contract? 
Contract valid? Liable? 
Judge 1 Yes Yes No No 
Judge 2 Yes No Yes No 
Judge 3 No Yes Yes No 
Majority Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 1: A three-member court 
 
33 See Mackie (1965) and Wright (1985), respectively. 
34 See, e.g., Braham and van Hees (2012). 




In this case, the majority answer to all three questions is “yes”, and yet no individual judge 
thinks that the defendant is liable. If – hypothetically – the court were to use the so-called 
“premise-based procedure”, it would reach its overall verdict as follows. It would take majority 
votes on the three premises for liability (was the action done, was it against the contract, was 
the contract valid), and it would then derive its overall verdict on the case from its collective 
judgments on those premises. Under this arrangement, there would be no need to take a vote 
on the issue of liability itself; the verdict would be derived via a form of “collectivized 
reasoning”, from democratically agreed premises. Given the individual judgments shown in 
Table 1, the premise-based procedure would support a “liable” verdict, despite the unanimous 
individual view that the defendant is not liable. This example illustrates that a collective 
decision may have been reached through a perfectly reasonable democratic procedure, such as 
the premise-based procedure, and yet no individual may have personally supported the ultimate 
outcome – here a “liable” verdict. If having voted for the outcome were a necessary condition 
for bearing some responsibility for it, then none of the individual judges would bear any 
responsibility in the present case.36  
Of course, one might object that the premise-based procedure is not the best decision 
procedure here, but the example generalizes. It can be shown that any democratically organized 
group that seeks to arrive at consistent collective judgments on several logically related issues 
cannot generally follow the majority judgment on every issue.37 Issue-by-issue majority voting 
would run the risk of producing an inconsistent pattern of judgments, as illustrated by Table 1. 
If the group is to function as an instrumentally rational group agent, with consistent collective 
views, then it must sometimes (in some logically possible situations) deviate from the views 
of a majority of its members. And so, we cannot presume that every group decision will be 
supported by a majority of group members, to whom the relevant responsibility can then be 
assigned. Although the details are complicated, I hope the basic point is clear enough. For a 
further analysis of the present problem, I refer the reader to the literature on judgment 
aggregation.38 The bottom line is that there is no general scheme available by which group 
responsibility can always be distributed to the group’s members: group responsibility is not 
generally reducible to individual responsibility. 
 
36 The analysis of this case would be more complicated if one took the view that, in cases such as that of the court, 
voting for an outcome is not a necessary condition for bearing some responsibility for it. One might argue, for 
instance, that strategically abstaining from voting on a controversial matter does not absolve one of responsibility. 
37 For a review of relevant results and further references, see List and Pettit (2011, ch. 2). 




6. Can groups also have rights of their own? 
I have described and defended the view that certain collective entities can bear responsibility 
in their own right, over and above their individual members. In closing, I would like to ask 
whether accepting this view commits us to accepting that those groups should be given rights 
as well. If groups can be duty-bearers, can they also be right-holders?  
I will argue that, in one sense, the answer is quite unproblematically positive, but in another, 
it is clearly negative. To distinguish those senses, I must begin with two clarifications about 
the notion of a “right”. First of all, the term “right” can refer either to a legal right or to a moral 
one. Legal rights are those rights that agents have under the legal systems they are subject to. 
For instance, I have a legal right to vote in my country of citizenship, but I don’t have a legal 
right to vote in the country I visit as a tourist. Moral rights, by contrast, are rights that agents 
have from the perspective of morality. We arguably all have the moral right to certain basic 
liberties and respectful treatment, whether or not we are lucky enough to live in a society in 
which those rights are legally entrenched. The second clarification is this. When we say that 
an agent has a particular right, where this entails certain powers or permissions and perhaps 
duties on the part of others, then the agent might have that right either non-derivatively or 
derivatively. A non-derivative right is one the agent has by virtue of some underlying moral 
status. The right might be grounded, for instance, in the fact that the agent matters intrinsically: 
he or she is an object of moral concern. The natural rights that human beings are thought to 
have by virtue of their humanity, or by virtue of their status as moral persons, would be 
examples of non-derivative rights. A derivative right, by contrast, is one the agent doesn’t have 
by virtue of any underlying moral status; rather, the right derives from something else. A 
derivative right might be grounded in its instrumental usefulness for promoting something else, 
which matters intrinsically. For example, a medical doctor might have certain derivative rights 
in his or her professional role, where those rights are justified by virtue of the fact that they are 
part of a normative system that serves the interests of society as a whole.  
Given these clarifications, I can now explain in what sense group agents can have rights, 
and in what sense they cannot. My claim is that organized collectives can have derivative rights 
(in principle, moral and legal), but they cannot have any non-derivative ones. Let me begin 
with the positive part of this claim. Consider the functions that collective entities perform in 
the social world. The state provides all sorts of services; universities educate students and 
contribute to our knowledge of the world; medical institutions look after people’s health; and 




economy. It is hard to deny that, given the way society is organized, those entities could not 
perform those functions unless they had certain rights, such as the right to own or rent property, 
the right to employ staff, the right to enter contracts and to engage in litigation when necessary, 
and so on. In recognition of these rights, the law treats the relevant collectives as legal persons 
and thereby considers them fit to be right-holders and duty-bearers. Of course, the rights in 
question are all derivative. They are not grounded in any special moral status of those 
collectives, but they are justified simply by virtue of the fact that, by and large, the normative 
system of which they are a part serves society’s interests. To be sure, there may be plenty of 
scope for improving that system. The philosophical point is just that, to the extent that giving 
certain rights to some collectives promotes the interests of the human members of society, 
group agents can unproblematically have those rights. That is the sense in which organized 
collectives can have derivative rights. 
Let me now turn to the negative part of my claim. I want to suggest that, unlike individual 
human beings, organized collectives cannot have any non-derivative rights. The reason is that 
collective entities lack the relevant moral status: they do not matter intrinsically. Their 
significance is only instrumental. In this respect, group agents differ fundamentally from 
individual human beings, and arguably also from some non-human animals such as the great 
apes and other mammals, all of whom – we may reasonably assume – matter intrinsically. But 
while the differential categorization of group agents, as compared to individual humans and 
even animals, may seem intuitive, we must show that it is philosophically defensible.39 At first, 
one might think that if organized collectives not only meet the conditions for intentional agency, 
but also qualify as full-blown moral agents, then it is hard to deny them the kinds of rights that 
individual moral agents have. If we accept collectivism with regard to responsibility, how can 
we defend individualism when it comes to rights? Wouldn’t a robust defence of group agency 
vindicate, for instance, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission to extend certain free-speech rights to corporations and other organizations, where 
those rights can then be exercised via corporate activities and monetary spending? 
To show that only individual human beings, and perhaps certain non-human animals, but 
not group agents can have non-derivative rights, we must show that the latter lack the kind of 
moral status that would ground such rights. To do so, we must appeal to an appropriate 
background criterion as to what the basis of an entity’s moral status is and show that group 
 





agents fail to meet that criterion. There are a number of possible criteria on offer, which 
approach the present issue in different ways.40  
One criterion for being an object of moral concern might be membership of the human 
species. This criterion is clearly satisfied by individual humans and violated by groups. But the 
criterion is somewhat ad hoc and has the unfortunate consequence of “throw[ing] animals 
under the bus”, as Will Kymlicka puts it.41 A less restrictive criterion for being an object of 
moral concern would be the possession of intentional agency. This criterion is satisfied not 
only by human beings, but also by many non-human animals as well as by group agents. Even 
robots and AI systems could easily satisfy it. The worry here is that the criterion is too 
permissive. On this criterion, we would have to extend our moral concern to entities ranging 
from British Petroleum to self-driving cars. A related but more restrictive criterion would be 
the possession of moral, not just intentional, agency. But, as we have already seen, group agents 
can satisfy that criterion, whereas, for instance, the great apes, who arguably matter 
intrinsically, would lose out.  
Can we come up with a better criterion? I think a plausible necessary (though perhaps not 
sufficient) condition for being an object of moral concern is the possession of phenomenal 
consciousness or, more broadly, the potential for phenomenal consciousness. Having 
phenomenal consciousness means being an entity that is a locus of subjective experiences: 
there is something it is like to be that entity, in Thomas Nagel’s words.42 This criterion would 
support our assumption that human beings are objects of moral concern and can therefore have 
non-derivative rights,43 and it would also allow us to make a similar case for animals. The claim 
that some non-human animals have subjective experiences, including experiences of pleasure 
and pain, is fairly uncontroversial. So, what about group agents? 
There are strong reasons to believe that group agents do not have anything like phenomenal 
consciousness or the potential for it. There is nothing it is like to be a group agent.44 At most, 
there is something it is like to be a member of a group agent; but that is because the members 
are loci of subjective experiences as individuals; the group as a whole isn’t. In particular, group 
agents lack the kinds of properties which, according to contemporary neuroscience, are 
 
40 On the grounds of moral status, see Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2018). 
41 See Kymlicka (2017).  
42 See Nagel (1974). I have previously discussed this criterion for having non-derivative rights in List (2018a,b). 
On phenomenal consciousness, see also Chalmers (1996). 
43 There are some complications here, which I cannot go into. One might ask whether babies or comatose patients 
would satisfy the present criterion. I think the answer is positive, provided we adopt a sufficiently broad 
interpretation of “potential” for phenomenal consciousness.  




associated with phenomenal consciousness. 45  Although I cannot go into the details here, 
phenomenal consciousness appears to occur only in information-processing systems in which 
there are massive internal high-bandwidth feedback mechanisms, as exemplified by the human 
cortex. Arguably, this sort of cortex-like informational integration is absent from organized 
collectives, even if we think of them as socially implemented intelligent systems.46  
For there to be a phenomenally conscious group agent, we would have to imagine the kind 
of scenario proposed by Ned Block in his “China brain” thought experiment.47 In this scenario, 
each member of a very sizeable population (say, that of China) is tasked with playing the role 
of one neuron in a biological brain, and the overall neural network is then established via 
internet connections. Conceivably, this kind of setup might replicate cortex-like informational 
integration in a social structure, so that the resulting group agent might be a candidate for 
phenomenal consciousness. But this is evidently a science-fiction scenario, and existing group 
agents, or plausible future ones, are not like this at all. In short, if the present empirical claims 
about the physical correlates of phenomenal consciousness are correct, and phenomenal 
consciousness (or the potential for it) is indeed a necessary condition for being an object of 
moral concern, then clearly group agents do not meet that condition, and consequently they 
cannot have any non-derivative rights.  
The bottom line, then, is that collective entities may unproblematically have certain 
derivative rights as well as legal personhood, but no non-derivative rights or a full-blown moral 
status. Furthermore, the criterion for adjudicating whether to give any derivative rights to 
collective entities is whether this serves the interests of those who do qualify as objects of 
moral concern, such as human beings and perhaps non-human animals. In the case of Citizens 
United, the only way in which extending free-speech rights to corporations could be justified 
would be by showing that this does indeed serve the interests of human society – a claim that 
is at least contentious. A mere appeal to the legal personhood of corporations would be 
insufficient as a basis for extending non-derivative rights to groups. 
In conclusion, there is no contradiction in recognizing certain collective entities as moral 
agents who are fit to be held responsible while at the same time denying that they have the 
kinds of rights that individuals have. Collectivism about responsibility is perfectly compatible 
with individualism about rights.  
 
45 This claim is supported, for instance, by integrated information theory (Tononi and Koch 2015), but other 
theories of the physical correlates of consciousness (such as the neural synchronization theory of Crick and Koch 
1990) would support it too. 
46 See List (2018), but see Schwitzgebel (2015). 
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